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Abstract 
It has been widely documented that the poor spend a significant proportion of their 
income on gifts even at the expense of basic consumption. We test three competing 
explanations of this phenomenon—peer effect, status concern, and risk pooling—based 
on a census-type primary household survey in three natural villages in rural China and on 
detailed household records of gifts received on major occasions. We show that gift-giving 
behavior is largely influenced by peers in reference groups. Status concern is another key 
motive for keeping up with the Joneses in extending gifts. In particular, poor families 
with sons spend more on gift giving in proportion to their income than their rich 
counterparts, in response to the tightening marriage market. In contrast, risk pooling does 
not seem to be a key driver of the observed gift-giving patterns. However, we show that 
large windfall income triggers the escalation of competitive gift-giving behavior. 
 
Keywords: social network, peer effect, risk pooling, status seeking, gift giving, 
ceremony 
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“If friends make gifts, gifts make friends.” Marshall Sahlins, 1972 
 
1. Introduction 
It has been widely documented that many of the poor spend a significant portion 
of their limited income on social spending, such as splendid funerals (The Economist 
2007; Mango et al. 2009), extravagant bride-prices and dowries (Rao 1993; Brown 2009), 
and lavish festivals (Banerjee and Duflo 2007), at the expense of their basic nutrition 
intake (Subramanian and Deaton 1996; Thomas and Strauss 1997; Chen and Zhang 
2010). Peer pressure, status concerns, and risk pooling are three notable explanations for 
this observed puzzle in the literature. 
Many of the poor live in a closely knit community. Their behavior is deeply 
influenced by their peers in the reference group. Peer effects can generate both positive 
and negative externality. On the positive side, peer pressure may facilitate technology 
adoption and social learning (Benabou 1993; Hoxby 2000; Glaeser and Scheinkman 
2001; Conley and Udry 2010). However, peer pressure can also induce socially 
undesirable behavior, such as juvenile delinquency (Haynie 2001). It is therefore likely 
that one’s gift-giving behavior is influenced by peers as well. 
Gift giving may also signal wealth and social status. If a higher social status is 
associated with greater rewards, such as higher likelihood of marriage for offspring, then 
concerns for status may intensify gift-giving competition. The competitive pressure is 
especially large for the lower tail of the distribution (Deaton 2001; Watson and 
McLanahan 2011; Brown, Bulte, and Zhang 2011) because of the unfavorable marriage 
market conditions for the poor. 
Gift-giving behavior has accompanied human beings for thousands of years. 
Facing various natural and human-made shocks, people have used gift giving as a means 
of smoothing shocks and mitigating risks. For example, funerals are very costly in many 
developing countries. It is hard for a family to come by the means to pay funeral 
expenses by itself. As a result, it is quite common that people extend gifts when attending 
funerals. The pooled resources can largely defray the funeral expenses. In this sense, the 
gift expenditures to others can be regarded as insurance premiums (Rosenzweig 1988; 
Coate and Ravallion 1993; Townsend 1994). It is likely that risk sharing represents 
another key motive for gift giving. 
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Previous studies have investigated the behavior of gift giving from different 
angles, such as risk sharing (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007) or status concern and peer 
pressure (Brown, Bulte, and Zhang 2011). In this paper, we attempt to simultaneously 
disentangle the three factors using a three-wave census-type household panel dataset 
combined with well-kept gift records for all households in three natural villages in rural 
China. Meanwhile, we try to improve the empirical identification along all the three 
dimensions. 
Our datasets have several salient features. First, because we have detailed income 
and expenditure information for all the households in the sampled villages over three 
periods, we are able to measure relative social status and examine its impact on gift 
giving along a wide spectrum of income distribution. Second, the complete gift records 
enable us to match gift givers and recipients, thereby providing us with an effective way 
to identify the role of risk pooling in gift-giving behavior along several dimensions. 
Third, the long-term gift records capture the dynamics of gift-giving activity, such as its 
recent escalation. The large variation in guest composition across occasions circumvents 
the main identification problems. Fourth, the gift records advance the literature on 
network formation through gift values, since relationship intensities often matter more to 
behavior than the connections themselves. 
As a preview of the main results, we find that gift-giving behavior is largely 
influenced by peers in the reference groups. Status concern is another key motive for 
keeping up the Joneses in extending gifts. In particular, poor families with sons spend 
more on gift giving in proportion to their income than their rich counterparts in response 
to the increasing marriage market squeeze. In contrast, risk pooling is not a key driver of 
the observed gift-giving patterns. Moreover, gift giving is largely reciprocal in China. 
After a small group of people receive unexpected windfall income, for example, they 
start to extend more generous gifts to others. Others have to follow suit, triggering the 
escalation of gift expenditure. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the patterns of gift giving 
in rural China; Section 3 discusses the data; Section 4 lays out our basic analytical 
framework; Section 5 discusses the main issues in peer effect identification and its 
relevance to our strategy; Section 6 specifies the empirical model; Section 7 presents the 
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main results on the determinants for gift spending and its escalation; finally, Section 8 
concludes with further discussion. 
 
2. Gift Giving in Rural China 
Gift exchange is commonly practiced in developing countries but rarely 
documented in the economics literature. Chinese society is largely relationship (guanxi) 
based and gift exchange plays an important role in maintaining guanxi. Gift giving is 
largely reciprocal. One is supposed to pay back previously received gifts later on 
according to the prevalent “market price” of gift giving.  
The analysis of gift giving in rural China is based on our surveyed villages in 
rural Guizhou (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1—Summary statistics by natural village (2009) 
  Village 
1 
Village 
2 
Village 
3 Total 
Total number of households 48 27 80 155 
Total population 203 96 295 594 
Distance to the county seat (km) 10.0 11.0 2.5 7.8 
Per capita cultivated land (mu) 0.87 0.16 1.10 0.71 
Share of flat land (%) 40.0 20.7 80.0 53.4 
Male head of household (Yes=1; No=0) 93.5 94.8 91.6 92.8 
Education of household head (years) 2.87 3.06 3.98 3.44 
Minority head of household (Yes=1; No=0) 2.9 90.1 5.9 18.9 
Share of household members aged 11–29, unmarried (%) 15.9 15.7 14.7 16.6 
Share of household members aged 60 and above (%) 14.2 17.9 12.5 14.1 
 
 Source: Authors’ survey data for the three natural villages where we collected gift records. 
 
Table 2.2 presents gift expenditure per occasion and the number of guests in 
coming-of-age ceremonies, weddings (bride’s family and groom’s family), and funerals 
over time. The average gift size has increased steadily for all the four occasions, as has 
the number of guests participating. However, the rising gift size is not sufficient to cover 
the total expenditures on these events. As shown in Table 2.3 on the total expenditures 
for the four types of events, the median expenditure for a coming-of-age ceremony is 
more than 8,000 Chinese yuan renminbi (CNY), while on average the host of such an 
event receives only CNY 3,782. In other words, the host has to cover more than 54 
percent of the expenses out of his own pocket. The gap is even larger for wedding 
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ceremonies among groom families: The amount of gifts received accounted for only 20 
percent of total expenditure in 2009.  
 
Table 2.2—Gift spending and sizes of ceremonies (2000–2009, per occasion) 
Year 
Coming‐of‐age  Male wedding  Female wedding  Funeral 
Mean 
gift 
(CNY) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
Mean 
gift 
(CNY) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
Mean 
gift 
(CNY) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
Mean 
gift 
(CNY) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
2000–
2004  28.8  18.1  35.5  41.7  20.3  31  41.6  21.1  22  23.5  17.2  31 
2005  25.1  12.3  34  45.9  27.2  38  ‐  ‐  ‐  28.7  17.4  49 
2006  27.6  8.0  41  55.4  29.4  34.3  58.1  24.7  31  21.8  13.3  61.9 
2007  46.6  27.8  46  50.5  25.9  40  53.3  24.1  26.3  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2008  ‐  ‐  ‐  53.6  34.8  35.5  59.7  29.2  36  83.4  42.1  56 
2009  73.3  41.6  51.5  90.6  52.3  37.3  68.4  39.7  45  37.9  23.6  75.5 
 
Source: Authors’ gift exchange data from three natural villages. 
Notes: All gift values have been adjusted for inflation based on the appropriate year’s China Statistical 
Yearbook published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, various issues. “-” means no 
ceremony occurred during that year. 
 
Table 2.3—Median expenditures (CNY) in organizing major ceremonies (1996–2009) 
Year  Coming‐of‐age  Wedding (groom’s family)  Wedding (bride’s family)  Funeral 
1996  ‐  4,500 (3.00)  3,157 (2.10)  2,688 (1.79) 
1997  ‐  3,852 (2.84)  3,100 (2.29)  3,471 (2.56) 
1998  ‐  5,211 (3.85)  3,025 (2.23)  3,170 (2.34) 
1999  ‐  3,634 (2.64)  3,829 (2.79)  4,328 (3.15) 
2000  ‐  6,250 (4.85)  2,929 (2.27)  4,393 (3.41) 
2001  ‐  7,371 (5.81)  5,644 (4.45)  3,388 (2.67) 
2002  ‐  7,347 (5.20)  4,536 (3.21)  3,402 (2.41) 
2003  ‐  7,891 (6.22)  5,143 (4.05)  4,655 (3.67) 
2004  ‐  10,423 (8.24)  4,243 (3.35)  6,150 (4.86) 
2005  3,208 (1.95)  9,486 (5.76)  7,633 (4.63)  5,156 (3.13) 
2006  3,387 (2.62)  11,805 (9.14)  7,502 (5.81)  6,175 (4.78) 
2007  4,284 (2.75)  8,569 (5.50)  4,927 (3.16)  8,096 (5.20) 
2008  8,046 (5.50)  13,983 (9.56)  5,833 (3.99)  7,561 (5.17) 
2009  8,154 (5.51)  15,066 (10.18)  7,766 (5.25)  7,151 (4.83) 
 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: 1. All expenditure amounts have been adjusted for inflation based on the appropriate year’s China 
Statistical Yearbook published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, various issues. All 
values are in CNY. 2. Recall data for coming-of-age ceremonies were collected only since 2005. 3. 
Numbers in parentheses denote expenditure as proportion of average per capita income in the 18 villages. 
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Figure 2.1 presents the share of gift expenditure by income quartile over our 
three-wave survey in China and other countries. The three dashed circles highlight our 
three-wave surveys. Over time, the share of gift and festival expenditure has increased 
steadily. There is an increasing spread in the share of gift and festival expenditure among 
the income quartiles. The poorer a household, the higher the share of consumption 
devoted to social spending, and the faster the growth in share of gift and festival 
expenditure between 2004 and 2009. 
 
Figure 2.1—Cross-country comparison of the share of household social spending (rural) 
 
Sources: Banerjee and Duflo 2007; authors’ three-wave census data in rural Guizhou; Rao 2001. 
Notes: 1. The categorization for rural China (rCHN1, rCHN2, rCHN3, rCHN4) is based on the same four 
quartiles as other datasets (dollar amounts in U.S. dollars): less than $1 per day (denoted as “1”), $1–$2 per 
day (denoted as “2”), $4–$6 per day (denoted as “3”), and $6–$10 per day (denoted as “4”). The poverty 
lines are adjusted according to 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) rate from 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp . 
2. Notation: CHN, China; Gua, Guatemala; INDU, India—Udaipur; INDO, Indonesia; INDK, India—
Karnataka; COTE, Côte d’Ivoire; MEX, Mexico; NIC, Nicaragua; PAK, Pakistan; PAN, Panama; PAPU, 
Papua New Guinea; SOU, South Africa; INDH, India—Hyderabad. “r” denotes rural area. 
3. The dashed circle and the arrow show rapid increase in the share of gift and festival expenditure in our 
three-wave Guizhou survey. 
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Figure 2.2 plots the annual growth rates of gift spending, consumption, and 
income over the period 2005–2009. Annual gift growth rates range from 18 percent to 45 
percent in three villages, much higher than the 10 percent annual growth rate of per capita 
consumption. While the share of expenditures allocated to food dropped from 48 to 42 
percent, the share of spending on gifts and festivals soared from 8 percent to 17 percent. 
Apparently, gift spending escalation is an acute phenomenon in this impoverished region.  
 
Figure 2.2—Annualized growth of (per capita) income, consumption, and gift spending 
 
 
Source: Gift records data (2005–2009) and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: Annualized growth rates have been adjusted for inflation based on China Statistical Yearbook 
issued by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, various issues. 
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3. Data Collection 
Three-Wave Census Survey 
The household information for this study comes from three waves of census-type 
household survey conducted by us in 18 selected natural villages in rural Guizhou, 
China.1 They are both geographically isolated and ethnically diversified. Local residents 
know each other well. Most residents’ kinship networks are confined to these villages. 
More than 20 ethnic groups are living in the area, including Han, Miao, Buyi, Gelao, and 
Yi. In total, ethnic minorities make up about 20 percent of population. 
The three rounds of surveys in 2005, 2007, and 2010 cover 801, 833, and 872 
households, respectively. The differences in sample size largely reflect demographic 
changes. All three waves include detailed information on household demographics, 
income, consumption, and transfers. Transfers include gifts received and extended. Since 
our analysis uses gift-exchange records from 3 of the 18 villages, only households 
involved in the social occasions surrounding the recorded gifts are relevant for this study. 
 
Gift-Exchange Records Collection 
Rural households usually keep the records of gifts received on major occasions 
for a long period because they have to pay back accordingly when the gift givers hold a 
social event (Yan 1996).2 In the survey area in Guizhou, we find that all the households 
keep a gift book. In early 2010, we used a digital camera to capture the gifts recorded in 
the books for major occasions (male family member’s wedding, female family member’s 
wedding, funeral, coming-of-age ceremony, child birth ceremony, and house-moving 
ceremony) during the period 2000–2009 for all the households in 3 natural villages. The 
3 natural villages were selected from the 18 natural villages (3 administrative villages) 
where the three-wave census survey was conducted (Table 2.1). In each administrative 
village, we selected the natural village with mirroring the average development level of 
the whole administrative village. 
                                                 
1 This survey was jointly conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the 
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and Guizhou University. 
2 Yan writes, “Ritualized gift giving is also associated with the custom of making and preserving gift lists. 
Gift lists are homemade books on red paper (funeral gift lists are made on yellow paper) inscribed with a 
traditional Chinese calligraphy brush. They serve as a formal record of all gifts received by the host of a 
family ceremony” (1996, page 49). 
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A unique Karst landform keeps the 3 villages isolated from the outside society. 
Among them, village 1 is the most remote (10 kilometers away from the county seat with 
poor road access), and local customs are well preserved. On the other hand, village 3 is 
only 2.5 kilometers away from the county seat. It is the most vulnerable to external 
changes, such as the recent social spending inflation. In between, village 2 is populated 
by the Buyi ethnic minority, who preserve the Catholic culture and ceremony tradition 
different from that of the major Han villages (such as villages 1 and 3). In major public 
ceremonies in village 2, people generally participate in the events (such as Halloween and 
Christmas) without bearing a huge burden of gift exchange.3 Since the surveyed villages 
are populated with Han group and ethnic minorities, we are able to explore social 
connections between ethnic groups. 
Based on the three-wave household surveys in 18 natural villages, we identify 335 
households in gift record books, including 160 households from the 3 natural villages 
where the gift records were collected and 175 households from the other 15 natural 
villages covered by our large-scale household survey.4 Once having joined in gift 
exchanges, most people remain active. A great proportion of previously inactive 
households become active at the end of each period. 
Figure 3.1 shows a map of the gift network in 1 of the 3 villages. In total, 8,074 
gift links during the period 2000–2009 are identified. The potential links include all 
households in the hosts’ local villages and the identified links between local villages and 
the other 15 surveyed villages, whether or not there was a gift given. The assumption is 
that all households in the same village know each other and are aware of the dates of 
ceremonies. Given the geographic and local social environment, this is very likely to be 
the case. Meanwhile, 4,611 cross–township/county gift links among 4,924 potential links 
were recorded. These potential cross–township/county links included all the recorded 
cross–township/county links and zero-gift-flow links between the hosts and their bride’s-
side blood relatives recalled by each household. Every effort was made to identify these 
potential but nonexistent gifts to circumvent sample attrition and sorting problems during 
                                                 
3 A major difference in this aspect between public celebrations in India and household ceremonies in China 
can be found in Rao (2001) and Chen (2009). 
4 Our census-type survey determines that all households in the eighteen villages, who had presented any 
gifts to people residing in the three villages in recent years, are identified. Other names, such as those from 
out of the three administrative villages, are not included in our analysis.  
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our records collection process. Nearly all households’ gift-receiving records for the 
ceremonies were included in this study, since less than 5 percent of households reported 
gift book loss or damage.5 
 
Figure 3.1—Dyadic links and gift exchange networks 
 
 
Source: Authors’ social network data from one of the three villages. 
Note: Dots of the same color show households in the same clan. Dots to the boundaries show households 
from other villages. The dots (households) are based on actual geographic locations. 
 
If all family members are illiterate, a group of two or three educated relatives 
usually helps record gift giving on the celebration days. However, names on the records 
are usually nicknames, which might not offer precise identification of the individual 
involved. To solve this problem, we showed a name list to each household to facilitate 
their identifying the people represented on the records. We also consulted many local 
people to help identify the people recorded by their nicknames. 
Information on kinship and relatedness among villagers was also collected and 
matched to each gift link. The information was verified with the help of village leaders, 
                                                 
5 We consulted on major ceremonies with village leaders and local residents to verify before going to 
individual families. Meanwhile, this prior information helped households recall and find gift books for us. 
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the elderly, and local elites. As do many other rural communities, each of the 3 surveyed 
villages has several major clans. Taking village 3 in Figure 3.1 as an example, 
households in the same clan usually live closer to each other for historical reasons. Gift 
exchanges are more prevalent within a clan than across clans. 
 
4. Risk Pooling and Network Formation: An Analytical Framework 
In the literature, most studies tie pairwise link formation to individual decisions. 
Separability of the utility function is imposed with the assumption that the utility derived 
from the network is equal to the sum of the utilities brought by each link and that these 
link-specific utilities are not affected by the structure of the network. Following the 
conventional setting (De Weerdt 2004; Udry and Conley 2005; Fafchamps and Gubert 
2007), we define the existence of a link ( ijL ) between two nodes of distance ijd . A link is 
established when the benefit from a link ( ( ,1) ( ,0))ij ijB d B d  exceeds its maintenance 
cost ( )ijC d . Since distance does not explain all aspects of link formation, a residual ije  
exists. Specifically,  
1ijL   if [ ( , 1) ( , 0)] ( ) 0ij ij ij ij ij ijB d L B d L C d e      . (1) 
Social distance ijd  involves indicators of multiple dimensions: spatial distance, 
family characteristics and relatedness, shared activities, and so on. The longer the social 
distance, the less homogeneous are the shocks, and the more there might be monitoring 
and enforcement difficulties. Therefore, both the benefit and the cost of link formation 
should increase with social distance ijd , leading to a trade-off between the scope and 
ability of mutual insurance in the networks. Thus, the effect of multidimensional social 
distance on link formation is an empirical question.  
First, income pooling should be more effective between households engaged in 
different activities or occupations, such as, in our context, between farmers and nonfarm 
migrant workers. A farmer’s income is determined by such factors as weather conditions 
and pest infestation, while the income of a nonfarm migrant worker depends on economic 
prosperity, which is expected to be uncorrelated with farm income. However, households 
with different occupations usually have less common ground to socialize with each other. 
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Second, taking care of children and elderly is a form of risk sharing that differs 
from income pooling. Young households with children are faced with different health 
risks than those faced by the elderly; moreover, younger households are more capable of 
helping each other than are the elderly. Therefore, households with a large difference in 
age structure have the potential to insure each other. However, their social interactions 
might be limited due to differences in lifestyle. 
Third, due to the potential inter-household externalities to education, links 
between the better educated and the less educated are more attractive to the latter than to 
the former. Likewise, the poor may have stronger motivation to link with the rich than 
vice versa. On the other hand, rich households might be willing to help poor households 
who are not able to bear large expenses resulting from shocks and ceremonies. Since link 
formation is directional and the incentives behind it are asymmetrical, social distance 
should capture this factor.  
Kinship may strengthen link formation inasmuch as it reflects history, norms, and 
trust in a community. Given a certain geographic closeness, blood relationships facilitate 
in punishing uncooperative behavior. From a Darwinist’s perspective, helping family 
members is a way to expand the gene pool. 
A level effect should also be included in framework (1) to explore whether 
households with certain common characteristics tend to form links. For instance, it is 
expected that wealthier and better-educated people tend to link to each other, and 
households with a higher share of elderly or children are less likely to link to each other. 
The wealth effect is captured by per capita income. Because networks affect the ability to 
generate income, income is endogenous to the network and thus should be instrumented 
in the first-stage estimation.6 
                                                 
6 Since one’s social network affects the capability of income generation, income is potentially endogenous 
to the network formation process. Households with better networks may earn higher incomes. Therefore, 
we instrument per capita income with variables that predate the formation of gift links, including education 
of the head, size of the head’s lineal family, major family productive assets (such as a cow, a horse, and 
farming machines), inherited land size, number of working members in a household, gender of the head, 
whether the head is a cadre, and shocks suffered during the year. Since income enters the dyadic 
regressions in difference and sum, we separately instrument the difference and sum in per capita income 
(Table A.1). Most instruments have strong predictive power, especially land, cow, relative network size, 
education, and shocks. Predicted sum and difference in per capita income are used in lieu of actual income 
in the estimations that follow. Predicted per capita income rather than predicted wealth is used, because it is 
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The framework to this point ignores peer influence in shaping one’s link 
formation decisions, which usually works in the same direction as the risk-pooling 
motive and may blur the identification. In a traditional rural society, peer influence 
matters because communities are isolated and people have close relations. 
Furthermore, the framework does not clearly consider the role of status. Unlike 
information networks, networks of gift giving on social occasions help in climbing social 
ladders and mobilizing resources in the future. The fact that status seeking works in the 
same direction as risk pooling and peer influence makes its identification important. 
 
5. Peer Effect Identification 
Although peer effect has been studied for decades, no consensus has been reached 
on its significance and magnitude due to criticisms related to identification (Manski 1993; 
Moffitt 2001; Brock and Durlauf 2001). Even less is known about the mechanisms 
through which it operates. Three challenges confront peer effect identification: first, the 
real group within which people interact with each other is a priori unknown; second, 
correlated effects confound the identification because people usually endogenously form 
peer groups or are affected by common group characteristics (for example, common 
shocks in the development literature and teacher effects in studies of education) and thus 
behave similarly; third, the reflection problem persists because people influence each 
other in a group, which hinders any judgment on whether a person’s action is the cause or 
the effect of peers’ actions. 
Reference Groups 
The definitions of reference groups vary substantially in the literature, from the 
most comprehensive, a national population, to the very restrictive, such as a grade cohort. 
The large variation in the scope of reference groups reflects how hard it is to establish 
who influences whom a priori. 
Most studies do not have that information due to limitations on their data, on their 
understanding of the specific context and social mechanism, or both. Instead, they 
assume individuals in the population as potential peers and define peer influence based 
                                                                                                                                                 
believed to be more precise than an index of wealth evaluated at subjective prices, especially in this 
context, where a great proportion of family assets is composed of dated housing. 
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on average intragroup externality that affects group members identically.7 However, 
different time and social constraints among agents suggest that the set of potential 
partners has large variation, whether or not the population is partitioned. 
In our study, identifying the effects of both peer pressure and status seeking on 
gift giving during social events requires an appropriate definition of the reference group. 
Peer pressure in sending gifts is most likely to work through information sharing among 
guests attending social events.8 Therefore, the main reference group for gift spending is 
defined according to gift presenters on each occasion. We also define reference groups 
for gift spending based on gift receivers to whom one presents gifts in any given year. A 
comparison of estimates from the two peer group definitions, fellow gift presenters and 
gift receivers, informs us of the relative intensity of peer pressure in extending gifts. 
Relative status is measured according to the geographic reference group.9 
According to a recent study (Mangyo and Park 2011), geographic reference groups, often 
at the village level, are salient for rural residents living in close proximity. In rural China, 
a natural village is evolved over generations. Due further to the local Karst landform that 
isolates the natural villages in this study from the outside, a natural village is particularly 
suitable to be treated as a unit for social comparison. As a result, we define the reference 
group as the natural village for purposes of measuring yearly household-specific social 
status. 
Correlated Effects 
Correlated effects may come from two sources: unobservable common shocks and 
endogenous group formation. To separate correlated effects that confound peer effect 
identification, some studies use randomly assigned peers (Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman 
2003), some use conditional variance restrictions that disentangle excess variance due to 
peer effect from that due to group-level sorting (Graham 2008), and others use 
                                                 
7 Another strategy is to pick at random many sets of potential peers to build a simulated likelihood (Mihaly 
2007). 
8 Rural residents send gifts to their local events, and information on the gift price is shared. On the day of a 
ceremony, an educated person is often responsible for keeping the record of gifts received. As a result, the 
market information on gifts given is largely common knowledge within a village. As shown by comparing 
kernel density estimates among social events, gift spending at each event tends to cluster. 
9 Ideally, the identification of relative status should follow that of peer effect. However, multiple relative 
status values appear for a household that gives gifts more than once a year, if fellow gift presenters per 
event are defined as peers. If gift receivers are defined as peers, missing values appear for a household that 
sends no gifts in a year. 
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composition variations of adjacent cohorts within schools to identify peer effect (Hoxby 
2000; Gibbons and Telhaj 2008; Ammermueller and Pischke 2009). Similar to the 
methodology of these latter studies, we identify peer effect through the large variation in 
the size and composition of guests attending each social event.  
To tackle the issue of common unobservable shocks, lagged all peers’ median gift 
per occasion is instrumented with lagged new peers’ median gift per occasion from 
brides’ out-of-township blood relatives.10 The longitudinal structure of the data allows us 
to track each household’s previous peers and distinguish between new peers and old 
peers. On the one hand, the large distance between villages in the mountainous region 
limits the spread of common shocks and the sharing of information, which mitigates the 
concern for common unobserved factors. Information sharing is further restricted by the 
patrilineal culture, whereby fellow villagers attending a male-side ceremony have little 
connection with the external relatives of the bride. On the other hand, new peers’ median 
gift per occasion is highly correlated with that of all peers by construction. These two 
relevant features of out-of-township new peers result in a good instrument. 
To mitigate the concern for self-selection into gift groups, all fellow villagers and 
brides’ out-of-township blood relatives, whether they present gifts or not, are included in 
the analysis, since all households in each village know each other well and know about 
social events due to close local connections spanning generations. Moreover, correlated 
effects arising from unobserved individual and group effects are taken care of in our 
fixed-effect estimations. We further control guests’ group characteristics to test whether 
individuals sort themselves into groups according to certain unobservable characteristics 
or abilities (Broeck and Dercon 2007). 
The Reflection Problem 
The reflection problem arises when the endogenous effect and exogenous effects 
are entangled in the identification of peer effect. Since only the endogenous effect can 
generate a social multiplier with policy implications, studies never give up finding 
effective solutions. Methods utilized to isolate the two effects include these: 
instrumenting peers’ current behavior with their lagged behavior (Hanushek et al. 2003) 
                                                 
10 The traditional patrilineal culture and land allocation system in rural China determine that most males 
stay in birth villages, while most females migrate out upon marriage. Since local geographic condition 
restricts social connections with the outside, most out‐of‐township new peers are brides’ blood relatives. 
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or the lagged treatment they received (Boozer and Cacciola 2001), specifying a nonlinear 
setting (Manski 1993; Brock and Durlauf 2001), designing a partial-population 
experiment setting that directly affects the behavior of some but not all group members 
(Bobonis and Finan 2009), and utilizing network information or partially overlapping 
groups (De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli 2010). 
In principle, the identification of endogenous effect from contextual effect is 
made possible when an appropriate exclusion restriction is found whereby an influencing 
factor of individual outcomes does not directly affect peers’ outcomes (Manski 1993). 
While it is difficult to distinguish a factor’s impacts on an individual from its impacts on 
peers using a standard dataset with perfectly overlapping peer groups, partially 
overlapping peer groups create direct as well as indirect connection. Ideally, rich 
information on social networks makes possible a clear identification (Calvó-Armengol, 
Patacchini, and Zenou 2009; De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli 2010; Lin 2010), but our 
outcome variable—individual gift spending per occasion—raises the concern for 
duplicated usage of gift information. Therefore, this strategy cannot be applied here. 
Nonetheless, the partially overlapping peer groups across social events separate 
new peers from old peers and out-of-township peers from local peers. As discussed 
above, gifts from brides’ out-of-township blood relatives generally have no direct effect 
on gift spending from local residents, thereby satisfying the exclusion assumption. In line 
with the literature, we also take lagged median gifts from fellow gift presenters to break 
down the reflective influence. 
 
6. Empirical Strategy 
Model Specification 
Our main empirical estimations are dyadic regressions. In network analysis, a 
dyad is a pair of agents. Dyadic data contain two types of information: link attributes ijw  
between nodes i  and j , and node attributes iz  and jz  for nodes i  and j , respectively. 
Therefore, the data are normally transformed into level effect ( i jz z ), social distance     
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( i jz z ), and link attributes ijw  to best preserve information.11 Since gift exchanges are 
directional, the outcome variable y  need not satisfy ij jiy y  for any i  and j . Following 
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), let 
, , , 0 1 , , , 1 2 , , 3 , , 4 , , , , , ,[ ] ( ) ( )i j c t i j c t i t j t i t j t i t i j t i t i j c ty m y z z z z RD w                   ,  (2)  
where -i denotes peers of household i; , , ,i j c ty  is the actual gift guest i  presents to 
the host j  on occasion c  at time t ; , ,i j tw  denotes link attributes between i and j at time t , 
such as cross-village or not and blood relations; and ,i tz  and ,j tz , respectively, denote 
attributes of households i and j at time t.  
Peer effect 1  is identified via an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Reference 
groups for gift spending are defined according to fellow gift presenters per occasion in 
the main estimations and gift receivers to whom one presents gifts per year in the 
robustness check. Compared with the methodology of Brown, Bulte, and Zhang (2011), 
which restricts peer groups at the village boundary, our novel definition of peer group 
enables us to eliminate correlated effects and contextual effects that would confound peer 
effect identification. 
In the main estimations, lagged median gift spending per occasion from brides’ 
out-of-township blood relatives, whether they sent a gift or not, instruments lagged all 
peers’ median gift to j  per occasion c , that is, , , , 1[ ]i j c tm y  . Adopting a nonlinear peer 
influence setting, that is, lagged median behavior among peers, partially overlapping 
guests across occasions creates exclusion restrictions that mitigate the reflection problem. 
Out-of-township peers circumvent the concern for correlated effects that arises 
from common unobservable shocks. All fellow residents within the village boundaries 
and brides’ out-of-township blood relatives, whether they present gifts or not, are 
included in the peer group to mitigate concern for self-selection into gift groups. 
To test the risk-pooling motive, we combine 2  and 3 : 2  identifies social 
distance effect while 3  identifies level effect. The two effects are controlled to eliminate 
the concern that apparent sorting by gift given could be due solely to the similarities in 
                                                 
11 Our conditional dyadic fixed effect model assumes conditional independence for consistency, which 
means that gift-giving decisions are independent from each other and conditional on all explanatory 
variables and node-specific unobserved factors. 
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preferences that come from closeness. A set of household factors is included to construct 
social distance and level effect indicators, including head characteristics (gender, marital 
status, education, age, and ethnicity), family characteristics (share of youth and elderly, 
cadre, household size, land size, family assets, number of farm workers, and number of 
nonfarm workers), and major household shocks (natural disaster, livestock death, and 
family member death). 
However, the link formation framework used by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) (1 
= link exists; 0 = link does not exist) conveys no information on how the intensity of a 
link is determined. The strength of links in many contexts is what really matters to an 
individual’s well-being. It shows to what extent one can rely on networks when needed, 
rather than what the mere existence of links could do. Therefore, we substitute the actual 
gift one presents on an occasion for the existence of a link as the dependent variable. 
From the econometric identification perspective, the Fafchamps and Gubert 
(2007) framework illustrates that low-degree variation hinders the effort to reliably 
identify determinants of more links, that is, the level effect 3 , since the degree for a 
directional link from i  to j  is either 0 or 1. Combined with the dependence of dyadic 
observations, the issue is that joint likelihood of the sample cannot be decomposed into a 
product of single observation likelihoods. However, link intensity based on gift amounts 
provides much larger variation. Therefore, a linear dyadic model of gift spending per 
occasion is estimated to circumvent the issue of indecomposable dependent dyadic 
observation likelihoods. 
Relative status ,i tRD  is measured via defining natural villages as peer groups. It is 
captured by the individual-specific Deaton relative deprivation index (Deaton 2001), the 
normalized difference between the average income of those with higher income and an 
income level x weighted by the proportion of those with income higher than the 
corresponding individual i. Its value lies between 0 and 1. The more relatively deprived, 
the higher the value.12 The identified impact is denoted by 4 . This is an improvement 
over the method of Brown, Bulte, and Zhang (2011), which uses community-specific 
distributional indicators to measure status seeking. 
                                                 
12 For a detailed review of a series of relative deprivation measures, see Chen and Zhang (2011). 
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The main specification (2), however, does not directly account for the recent gift 
escalation. Manipulating the dyadic observations to difference between each pair of 
households with zero and nonzero gift exchanges,13 the pairwise difference model (3) 
investigates how the incremental gift spending can be interpreted as influenced by three 
major factors: risk sharing, changes in status, and changes in peer influence. The pairwise 
difference model removes the unobserved pair heterogeneity: 
, , 1 , , 1 2 , , 3 , , 4 , , ,[ ] ( ) ( )i j t i j t i t j t i t j t i t i j ty m y z z z z RD               . (3)  
To check whether peer effect is robust to more IVs, we keep out-of-township 
peers’ median gifts and additionally follow the strategy of De Weerdt and Dercon (2006), 
which uses changes in peers’ windfall income and remittance to instrument changes in 
peers’ median spending per occasion. Changes in peers’ windfall income directly affect 
changes in peers’ gift spending and exert only indirect impact on one’s gift spending 
growth via peer influence. 
Dependence of Dyadic Observations 
Due to the presence of node-specific characteristics common to all links 
containing that node, dyadic links are not independent. The nonindependence feature can 
be expressed as , ,( , ) 0i j i kE    , , ,( , ) 0i j k iE    , , ,( , ) 0i j k jE    , and , ,( , ) 0i j j kE     for 
all k. Conventional ordinary least squares estimation generates consistent coefficient 
estimates but inconsistent standard errors. Monte Carlo simulations show that the 
corrected standard errors can be much larger, especially when the average links per nodes 
is large (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). 
Three general categories of approaches have been utilized to tackle the 
dependence of dyadic observations. The first category is to run the generalized least 
squares estimation while assuming some form for the covariance matrix. However, the 
method has not been as thoroughly worked out as panel data (Simpson 2001). 
The second category of approaches is to correct for the understated dyadic 
p-values or standard errors. The conventional method has one dimension to be clustered, 
while for dyadic data we need to simultaneously cluster two dimensions, gift presenters 
and gift receivers. Three corresponding methods are developed in this category. First, a 
                                                 
13 We restrict our analysis to dyadic links between households that once held social occasions. 
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multiway clustering method is developed to allow arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
intragroup correlation in distinct non-nested categories (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 
2011; Thompson 2009). Though applied in some settings with , ,( , ) 0i j i kE     or 
, ,( , ) 0i j k jE    , the clustering does not consider the cases when , ,( , ) 0i j k iE     or 
, ,( , ) 0i j j kE    . A second method, quadratic assignment procedure (QAP), is widely 
utilized in the sociology literature. QAP uses permutation methods to adjust p-values, but 
it relies on bootstrapping (Simpson 2001; Santos and Barrett 2010). The third method in 
this category, that of Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), corrects dyadic standard errors due 
to the cross-observation correlation in error terms involving certain individuals. It thereby 
more thoroughly adjusts for dependence of dyadic observations. 
The third category uses individual fixed effect to purge out the unobserved 
attributes (De Weerdt 2004; Udry and Conley 2005). For the dyadic data, the dyadic 
fixed-effect model involves putting in a dummy variable for each gift presenter and gift 
receiver. However, a large set of dummies often leads to inefficiency or substantive 
parameters without estimation when the covariate does not vary much along a dimension. 
Meanwhile, the fixed-effect model may not handle some forms of correlated errors 
(Thompson 2009). Another limitation with dyadic fixed effects is that they limit the set of 
covariates that can be included due to collinearity. Fortunately, the long-term network 
records and dispersed gift spending along both dimensions allow us to identify the 
parameters with a large set of dummies. 
Though all the three methods are effective in their own ways, there still is an 
assumption that the error terms of two dyads containing no mutual members are 
uncorrelated. We relax this assumption in the robustness check through clustering the 
observations by time periods. Results, not shown here to save space, indicate that this 
affects only standard errors, not inference. 
In this paper, we estimate dyadic regressions across all possible dyads using 
De Weerdt dyadic fixed-effect correction (De Weerdt 2004), Fafchamps-Gubert (FG) 
standard error correction (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007), and QAP (Simpson 2001). The 
absence of some dyadic observations is perfectly predicted by a household’s never 
holding any ceremonies in the past few years, two households’ not knowing each other 
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across villages, or both. Therefore, there is no point including those pairs in the 
estimation. All estimations are based on an N x N square adjacency matrix composed of 
(potential) pairwise connections among event organizers. Through this survey design, 
square adjacent matrices are built.14 
To implement the De Weerdt dyadic fixed-effect correction, a set of dummy 
variables is introduced, one for each household in the sample indicating whether that 
household is involved in a pair. Every row of the data contains two dummies equal one. 
Combined with the observable attribute variables, the set of dummies controls the 
unobserved attributes left in the error term. 
The FG standard error correction uses the following formula to correct the 
covariance matrix for the coefficient estimates . N denotes number of dyadic 
observations and K is the number of regressors. X is the matrix of all regressors and ijX
is the vector of regressors for dyadic observation ij. We have 1ijklm   if i k , j l , i l
, or j k , and 0 otherwise. The FG method should be implemented on an N x N square 
adjacency matrix. 
^
' 1 ' ' 1
1 1 1 1
1( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
N N N N
ijkl
ij ij kl kl
i j k l
m
Var X X X u u X X X
N K N
  
   
   . (4) 
To implement QAP, the dependent variable is permuted and merged back with the 
independent variables. During repeated permutations, values sharing a row or column in 
the original data will share a row or column in the permuted data. Therefore, we preserve 
any dependence among elements of the same row or column but eliminate any 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables. Then we run 
the estimation with the new merged dataset and repeat the permutation and estimation to 
generate an empirical sampling distribution. If the actual coefficient is at an extreme 
percentile of the distribution under the null, we can reject the null hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
14 This strategy is consistent with the standard social network survey that asks respondents to identify a list 
of other households on which they could rely in case of need or to whom they give help when called upon 
to do so. 
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7. Empirical Results 
Determinants for Gift Spending per Occasion 
We first attempt to explore factors for gift exchanges. In Table 7.1, three standard 
error corrections are adopted in the dyadic estimation of determinants for gift spending. 
Regression 1 adjusts for dyadic standard errors according to FG, regression 2 reports 
QAP adjusted p-value, and regression 3 presents results from the De Weerdt dyadic 
fixed-effect estimations. 
 
Table 7.1—Dyadic regression on gift expenditure per occasion 
 
R1  R2  R3 
FG 
SE correction 
Quadratic Assignment 
Procedure (p‐value)  
De Weerdt  
SE correction 
Social distances (def(Zi , Zj))     
Cumulated shocks  ‐0.079**  (0.04)  ‐0.076  (0.13)  ‐0.130  (0.09) 
Head minority status  ‐0.061  (0.06)  ‐0.022  (0.43)  2.026**  (1.01) 
Household size  0.022  (0.02)  0.012  (0.36)  ‐0.063  (0.09) 
Number of farm workers  0.047  (0.04)  0.031  (0.25)  0.081  (0.17) 
Number of nonfarm workers  0.007  (0.02)  0.018  (0.34)  ‐0.026  (0.08) 
Head education  ‐0.005  (0.01)  ‐0.008  (0.33)  ‐0.043  (0.03) 
Head gender  0.019  (0.08)  0.053  (0.41)  1.823  (1.37) 
Cadre  ‐0.055  (0.08)  ‐0.021  (0.43)  ‐0.237  (0.23) 
Head marital status  0.147*  (0.08)  0.113  (0.24)  ‐0.062  (0.32) 
Head age  0.016***  (0.00)  0.015***  (0.00)  0.071*  (0.04) 
Share of elderly  ‐0.315***  (0.11)  ‐0.294  (0.12)  ‐1.082**  (0.47) 
Share of unmarried sons  ‐0.097  (0.08)  ‐0.081  (0.29)  ‐0.130  (0.31) 
Per capita income (predicted, log)  0.248***  (0.04)  0.260***  (0.00)  0.246***  (0.04) 
Level effect (sum(Zi , Zj))     
Cumulated shocks  ‐0.040  (0.03)  ‐0.050  (0.28)  0.089  (0.07) 
Head minority status  0.014  (0.06)  0.030  (0.44)  ‐0.453  (0.86) 
Household size  0.099***  (0.02)  0.093***  (0.01)  0.100  (0.08) 
Number of farm workers  0.067*  (0.04)  0.037  (0.24)  0.021  (0.06) 
Number of nonfarm workers  0.009  (0.02)  0.029  (0.32)  ‐0.125*  (0.08) 
Head education  0.011  (0.01)  0.016  (0.23)  0.051  (0.03) 
Head gender  ‐0.077  (0.08)  ‐0.071  (0.36)  ‐2.276  (1.39) 
Cadre  0.321***  (0.08)  0.334**  (0.02)  0.293  (0.23) 
Head marital status  ‐0.075  (0.08)  ‐0.110  (0.27)  ‐0.630**  (0.31) 
Head age  ‐0.005*  (0.00)  ‐0.005  (0.18)  ‐0.047  (0.04) 
Share of elderly  0.494***  (0.11)  0.489**  (0.03)  0.420  (0.49) 
Share of unmarried sons  0.215***  (0.07)  0.212  (0.13)  0.309  (0.30) 
Per capita income (predicted, log)  0.495***  (0.06)  0.470***  (0.00)  0.804***  (0.11) 
Link attributes             
Lineal relatives or not  1.578***  (0.12)  1.706***  (0.00)  1.566***  (0.13) 
Across villages or not  ‐1.938***  (0.10)  ‐1.814***  (0.00)  ‐1.761***  (0.11) 
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Peer influence     
Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, 
log)  0.262**  (0.12)  0.263**  (0.05)  0.455*  (0.27) 
Status seeking     
Deaton relative deprivation  0.135  (0.13)  0.567**  (0.05)  0.257  (0.31) 
R‐square / N  0.44 / 3,136  0.47 / 3,136  0.55 / 3,136 
 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data.  
Notes: Dyadic standard errors are reported in R1 and R3, and QAP p-values are reported in R2.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Village and year fixed effects are 
controlled. 
 
We find incomplete risk pooling. The estimation in regression 1 shows that 
households do not purposefully insure along occupation or education, but they do 
significantly insure each other along income profile and against shocks. Younger families 
send more gifts to households with senior members.15 Level effects show more intense 
gifts between cadres and richer households. Families with unmarried sons are motivated 
to link to each other in exchange for insurance against large expenses on future weddings. 
Gift giving is more intense between lineal relatives. Given a lineal relative relationship, 
we find significantly less gift spending per occasion across villages, suggesting that intra-
village social links are valuable. It also means that monitoring and enforcement 
difficulties dominate the concern with risk pooling.16, 17 Regressions 2 and 3 present 
similar results on risk sharing. The differences lie in insignificant insurance against 
shocks. 
Peer influence is salient. Regressions 1–3 show that a 1 percent increase in peers’ 
gift spending leads to an increase in gift giving per occasion by 0.26 percent, 0.26 
percent, and 0.46 percent, respectively. The FG and QAP methods demonstrate very 
similar results that are consistent with the experience of Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) 
and of Santos and Barrett (2010). 
                                                 
15 Unlike other studies using household head age, our family demographic structure indicators in terms of 
share of elderly and share of unmarried sons are controlled. Our structure more directly captures potential 
complements in taking care of the elderly and insuring against lump-sum wedding expenditure for an 
unmarried son, respectively. 
16 Our estimation of geographic proximity might be more reliable than that of Fafchamps and Gubert 
(2007), since variations in geographic distance are larger in our dataset, capturing numbers of cross-village 
links, while this type of link is absent in Fafchamps and Gubert. 
17 There is a concern that households may self-select into a neighborhood. However, the historically 
evolved locality of farmland in rural China prevents endogenous household placement. See Figure 3.1 for 
the typical pattern of household geographic clustering based on inherited farmland in each clan. 
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Status seeking weakly determines more intense gift spending for the lower tail of 
the distribution. For regressions 1–3, the lowest-ranked households spend 13.5 percent, 
56.7 percent, and 25.7 percent more, respectively, on gift giving per occasion than do top 
households. 
Determinants for Changes in Gift Spending per Occasion 
Having presented the determinants for gift spending on an occasion, we now 
explore the main issue—driving forces behind the recent escalation in gift spending. The 
estimation methods in regressions 1–3 in Table 7.2 correspond to those of regressions 1–
3 in Table 7.1, respectively. 
 
Table 7.2—Pairwise dyadic regression on changes in gift expenditure per occasion 
 
R1  R2  R3 
FG 
SE correction 
Quadratic Assignment 
Procedure (p‐value) 
De Weerdt  
SE correction 
Social distances (def(Zi , Zj)) 
Cumulated shocks  ‐0.146**  (0.07)  ‐0.060  (0.21)  0.604***  (0.20) 
Head minority status  0.214***  (0.04)  0.119*  (0.05)  ‐1.992***  (0.64) 
Household size  0.019  (0.02)  0.015  (0.25)  0.037  (0.06) 
Number of farm workers  0.012  (0.01)  0.010  (0.32)  0.014  (0.02) 
Number of nonfarm workers  0.002  (0.02)  0.003  (0.48)  0.084*  (0.05) 
Head education  ‐0.006  (0.01)  ‐0.002  (0.44)  ‐0.026  (0.03) 
Head gender  ‐0.021  (0.07)  ‐0.009  (0.47)  ‐4.901**  (1.88) 
Cadre  0.248***  (0.09)  0.098  (0.14)  ‐0.115  (0.24) 
Head marital status  0.091  (0.06)  0.039  (0.33)  0.045  (0.20) 
Head age  0.003  (0.00)  0.001  (0.35)  ‐0.274***  (0.09) 
Share of elderly  0.027  (0.11)  0.060  (0.32)  0.185  (0.59) 
Share of unmarried sons  ‐0.182**  (0.08)  ‐0.093  (0.16)  ‐0.134  (0.35) 
Per capita income (pred, log)  0.199  (0.15)  0.070  (0.31)  ‐1.137***  (0.37) 
Level effect (sum(Zi , Zj)) 
Cumulated shocks  ‐0.017  (0.03)  ‐0.002  (0.50)  0.038  (0.05) 
Head minority status  ‐0.170***  (0.04)  ‐0.078  (0.11)  ‐4.304***  (1.57) 
Household size  ‐0.052***  (0.02)  ‐0.024*  (0.08)  ‐0.016  (0.06) 
Number of farm workers  0.031*  (0.02)  0.031  (0.23)  0.025  (0.02) 
Number of nonfarm workers  ‐0.036**  (0.02)  ‐0.019  (0.17)  ‐0.072*  (0.04) 
Head education  0.017**  (0.01)  0.011*  (0.08)  0.038  (0.03) 
Head gender  ‐0.151**  (0.06)  ‐0.085  (0.15)  ‐4.213***  (1.20) 
Cadre  ‐0.221***  (0.07)  ‐0.104*  (0.07)  0.112  (0.15) 
Head marital status  0.079  (0.05)  0.045  (0.30)  ‐0.123  (0.23) 
Head age  ‐0.001  (0.00)  ‐0.001  (0.46)  ‐0.040*  (0.02) 
Share of elderly  0.208**  (0.10)  0.143  (0.14)  1.078**  (0.48) 
Share of unmarried sons  0.162***  (0.06)  0.095  (0.12)  0.512**  (0.23) 
Per capita income (pred, log)  0.010  (0.05)  ‐0.011  (0.36)  0.210***  (0.07) 
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Change in peer influence 
Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, 
log)  0.698***  (0.15)  0.717***  (0.00)  0.506***  (0.14) 
Change in status seeking 
Deaton relative deprivation  0.750***  (0.27)  0.845***  (0.00)  0.821***  (0.26) 
R‐square / N  0.18 / 3,136  0.11 / 3,136  0.24 / 3,136 
 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: Dyadic standard errors are reported in R1 and R3, and QAP p-values are reported in R2.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Village and year fixed effects are 
controlled. 
 
Different from gift giving itself, the evidence for risk pooling through gift 
spending escalation is largely insignificant. We find risk sharing responding to shocks 
only in regression 1. Health and weather shock smoothing and income pooling are even 
of the opposite sign in regression 3, suggesting that poorer households suffering from 
more shocks purposefully connect with richer counterparts through rapidly growing gifts. 
Under regressions 1 and 3, gift spending among families with unmarried sons or senior 
members experiences a higher increase. Throughout the three scenarios we do not 
observe gift escalation caused by risk sharing across occupations. 
The marginal peer effect is much larger in promoting gift escalation than in 
explaining gift spending itself. A 1 percent growth in peers’ gift spending increases own 
gift expenditure per occasion by 0.70 percent under FG correction, 0.72 percent under 
QAP, and 0.51 percent under De Weerdt correction. 
Being more deprived in social ladders boosts gift spending growth. A 1-point 
increase in the Deaton relative deprivation index, that is, from the bottom to the top in the 
distribution, causes a 75 percent higher increase in gift spending per occasion under FG 
correction, an 85 percent higher increase under QAP estimation, and an 82 percent higher 
increase under De Weerdt correction. Compared with its weak impact on gift giving, the 
rapid increase in gifts is well explained by the motive to improve relative standing. 
Following the IV strategy in De Weerdt and Dercon (2006), we further add 
changes in peers’ windfall income and remittance to instrument changes in peers’ median 
gift per occasion and conduct four robustness checks (Table 7.3). Windfall income in our 
context includes two exogenous sources: resettlement subsidy targeting dilapidated 
houses and vulnerable habitats, and land acquisitions subsidy due to urbanized projects 
near the local county seat (Table A.2). Both sources of income survive the test of their 
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association with observable family characteristics (Table A.3), which suggests that they 
are largely random to household characteristics. To mitigate endogeneity that drives the 
effect of remittance on gift giving, remittance is restricted to that sent from household 
members who migrated at least two years ago. 
 
Table 7.3—Pairwise dyadic regression on changes in gift expenditure with more IVs 
(Changes in peers’ windfall income, changes in remittance, and changes in out-of-township 
median gift per occasion as IVs) 
 
Marginal 
effect  Standard error 
Pairwise dyadic regression—second stage 
1.Pairwise difference model (under FG standard error correction) 
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log)  0.749***  (0.15) 
Δ Deaton relative deprivation  0.747***  (0.27) 
2. Pairwise difference model (under Quadratic Assignment Procedure)  
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log)  0.778***  (0.00) 
Δ Deaton relative deprivation  0.840***  (0.00) 
3. Pairwise difference model (under De Weerdt standard error correction)  
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log)  0.548***  (0.14) 
Δ Deaton relative deprivation  0.761***  (0.26) 
Pairwise dyadic regression—first stage 
1st stage: Δ out‐of‐township median gift (per occasion, lag, log)  0.687***  (0.02) 
Δ peers’ windfall income (lag, log)  0.016**  (0.01) 
Δ peers’ remittance (lag, log)  0.007  (0.02) 
F‐statistic for joint significance  19.28 
p‐value for Hansen j‐statistic  ‐ 
 
Household fixed‐effect regression—second stage 
4. Household first‐difference model (DV: average gift per occasion in each year; gift receivers as peers) 
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log)  0.363***  (0.09) 
Δ Deaton relative deprivation  0.465**  (0.24) 
Household fixed‐effect regression—first stage 
Δ peers’ windfall income (lag, log)  0.210***  (0.04) 
Δ peers’ remittance (lag, log)  0.361***  (0.07) 
F‐statistic for joint significance   14.90 
p‐value for Hansen j‐statistic  0.41 
 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: 1. Scenarios 1 and 3 in the second stage report dyadic standard errors. Scenario 2 in the first stage 
reports QAP p-values. Scenario 4 reports robust standard errors. 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 3. The previous IV—changes in out-of-township peers’ median gift spending 
per occasion—is utilized. Meanwhile, two additional IVs are used, changes in peers’ windfall income and 
changes in peers’ remittance. The instrumental variables strategy follows De Weerdt and Dercon (2006). 
We adopt a more exogenous remittance definition that includes only family members who migrated at least 
two years ago. 4. The organization of the observations by household and year in the household fixed-effect 
estimation (scenario 4) prohibits us from identifying out-of-township peers’ median gift spending pending 
per occasion. Therefore, it is dropped from the IV list. 
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The F-statistic for the first-stage estimations demonstrates that the IVs have large 
predicting power, while the p-values for the Hansen j-statistic suggest that the 
instruments are not over identified. All four estimations on changes in gift expenditure 
with these IVs confirm peer effect and status seeking. 
First, pairwise difference models are estimated with these IVs. The identified 
marginal peer effects are 0.75 under FG correction, 0.78 under QAP, and 0.55 under 
De Weerdt correction. The identified status-seeking effects are 0.75 under FG correction, 
0.84 under QAP, and 0.76 under De Weerdt correction. All identified peer effects and 
status seeking are of high significance. 
Second, instead of defining one’s fellow gift presenters in each social event as 
peers, we identify peers as a set of gift receivers for each household over a year.18 We 
conclude that peer pressure in extending gifts comes from both fellow ceremony guests 
and event organizers, the former dominating the latter with regard to the marginal effect. 
The identified peer effect is 0.36, closer to that of the De Weerdt scenario. The status-
seeking effect is 0.47, which is smaller than that of any of the three pairwise dyadic 
regressions. 
In the first-stage estimations for both pairwise dyadic regression and household 
fixed-effect regression, changes in peers’ median windfall income significantly predict 
changes in peers’ median gift per occasion, while remittance demonstrates significant 
impact in the household fixed-effect model. There is no windfall income-sharing 
mechanism in the 18 villages. Therefore, changes in peers’ windfall income should exert 
only indirect impact on own gift growth via peers’ gift expenditure and its influence over 
own gift spending, generating a spillover effect. The resettlement subsidy and land 
acquisitions subsidy are supposed to fulfill specific objectives. However, gift spending 
seems to be very responsive to these income sources, possibly due to the wealth effect 
that triggers gift escalation. 
Rapid economic development in rural China continues to bring large windfall 
income opportunities, and at the same time rising wages in recent years may be 
                                                 
18 The median values are taken for a set of own gift-sending links per year (the left-hand side) and a set of 
all peers’ gift-sending links per year (the right-hand side). The resulting dataset has one observation for 
each household per year, and a household fixed-effect model is estimated that regresses median own gift 
spending per occasion within each year on median peers’ gift spending per occasion. This model eliminates 
the household unobserved factor(s) that may result in inconsistent estimation of peer effect. 
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increasing remittance. If these incomes are unevenly distributed, it is very likely that gift 
expense escalation spills over within communities, exerting a disproportionate impact on 
the poor.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Lavish household social spending has been widely observed in rural China. This 
paper studies an impoverished context wherein people spend heavily on gifts at the 
expense of basic consumption. Complementary to the literature that studies the 
determinants of total household social spending, we stick to the micro foundations of the 
behavior—how own gift spending for an event responds to relative status, peer influence, 
and risk sharing. We present estimates for the separate effects of each of these factors on 
gift giving. 
Our results confirm the prevalence of peer influence and status-seeking 
motivation in shaping gift spending escalation. The two effects persist upon applying 
different dyadic standard error corrections, adopting alternative IVs, changing reference 
groups from fellow ceremony guests to event organizers, controlling group characteristics 
that may correlate with network formation and own gift giving, and clustering by year to 
further deal with link dependence. 
The risk-sharing effect on gift giving is consistently observed only via income 
pooling, but it is not evident via occupation diversification, education, shock smoothing, 
and so on. Moreover, none of the above social distances accounts for the recent gift 
escalation. One standard interpretation is that network maintenance cost in some 
dimensions is too high to sustain. 
Gift spending during social events is associated with status awards. Therefore, we 
observe that lower-ranked households are more motivated to invest in gifts. In particular, 
households with unmarried sons tend to extend more gifts. Considering the finding that 
part of the effect is captured by the status-seeking factor (Watson and McLanahan 2011), 
the evidence becomes more salient. This is hardly surprising when the marriage market in 
China is tightening and favorable to girls. The pressure to build bigger houses, bid up 
bride-prices, and throw larger wedding banquets to improve their sons’ likelihood of 
marriage drives households with sons to invest early in the market. 
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The capability and motive for gift giving is amplified by massive windfall income 
and other opportunities amid the rapid development in China. Though received by only 
some households, their effects spill over to peers and contribute to the escalation in gift 
expenditure. For instance, the passing of the Lewis turning point means significantly 
rising wages in the labor market (Zhang, Yang, and Wang 2011), which coincides with 
the inflating cost of ceremonies. Meanwhile, official subsidies have been implemented 
over the past five years, such as direct grain subsidy since 2005 and a lumpy land 
acquisitions subsidy due to the accelerating urbanization process in rural China. The 
challenge is to minimize the negative externalities caused by peer influence over gift 
giving and to promote more effective risk pooling for the poor on social occasions. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Tables 
 
Table A.1—Instrumenting income 
Sum of per capita income  Difference in per capita income
All regressors as sums  All regressors as differences 
Land (mu)  0.02***  0.02** 
(0.00)  (0.01) 
Machine (dummy)  ‐0.23***  0.09 
(0.06)  (0.18) 
Cow (#)  0.05***  0.11*** 
(0.01)  (0.03) 
Horse (#)  ‐0.06  0.06 
(0.04)  (0.13) 
Hhsize (# members)  ‐0.07***  ‐0.15*** 
(0.01)  (0.02) 
Network size (# lineal relatives, log)  1.22***  0.13 
(0.20)  (0.61) 
Education (years)  0.01**  0.08*** 
(0.01)  (0.02) 
Sex (dummy)  ‐0.16***  0.31** 
(0.05)  (0.15) 
Cadre (dummy)  ‐0.04  ‐0.49*** 
(0.04)  (0.12) 
Shocks (# times)  ‐0.19***  ‐0.14*** 
(0.01)  (0.04) 
Year dummies  Y  Y 
Village dummies  Y  Y 
R‐square  0.83  0.45 
N  3,136  3,136 
 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: Dyadic standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
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Table A.2—Summary statistics for windfall income and nonearned income 
Year  Mean*  Median*  SD*  N* 
  Direct grain subsidy (targeting grain‐growing area) 
2004  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2006  24.67857  20.5  9.81  14 
2009  120.5333  90  62.57  105 
  Remittance (from hh members who migrated at least 2 years ago) 
2004  1,385.588  980  686.47  34 
2006  3,357.313  2,000  1,685.53  67 
2009  3,635.147  3,000  2,656.85  68 
  Resettlement subsidy (targeting dilapidated houses and vulnerable habitats) 
2004  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2006  441.1692  396  321.01  13 
2009  902.5333  600  678.51  15 
  Land acquisitions subsidy (targeting hhs involved in projects near county seat) 
2004  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2006  8896  10,000  5,548.74  5 
2009  60,147.5  55,000  35,341.32  18 
 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: * households who received the specific subsidies or remittances. “-” denotes no occurrence. 
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Table A.3—Windfall income and family characteristics 
  1  2  3  4 
   Resettlement subsidy (logit)  Land acquisitions subsidy (logit) 
Network size (# lineal 
relatives, log) 
0.00  0.01  ‐0.09  ‐0.07 
(1.00)  (0.77)  (0.54)  (0.50) 
Hhsize (# members)  0.02  0.02  0.40  0.40 
  (0.93)  (0.90)  (0.45)  (0.31) 
Share of migrants  ‐1.08  ‐0.76  1.81  3.62 
  (0.45)  (0.58)  (0.52)  (0.24) 
Sex (dummy)  ‐1.00  ‐0.91  ‐0.72  ‐0.65 
  (0.18)  (0.21)  (0.49)  (0.23) 
Minority (dummy)  ‐0.54  ‐0.21  ‐1.21  0.73 
  (0.46)  (0.67)  (0.35)  (0.41) 
Education (years)  ‐0.02  0.00  ‐0.07  0.26 
  (0.84)  (0.95)  (0.82)  (0.17) 
Cadre (dummy)  0.69  0.62  0.31  0.42 
  (0.26)  (0.30)  (0.22)  (0.24) 
Age (year)  0.04  0.03  0.22  0.15* 
  (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.12)  (0.06) 
Share of the elderly  ‐1.75  ‐0.50  ‐5.24  0.26 
  (0.19)  (0.67)  (0.36)  (0.93) 
Share of youth  0.54  2.22**  ‐0.03  0.76 
  (0.61)  (0.02)  (0.99)  (0.81) 
Land (mu)  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  0.28  ‐0.01 
  (0.85)  (0.56)  (0.24)  (0.96) 
Cow (#)  0.02  0.16  ‐1.66  ‐0.02 
  (0.95)  (0.55)  (0.19)  (0.98) 
Horse (#)  ‐0.01  ‐0.14  ‐0.21  ‐0.32 
  (0.99)  (0.88)  (0.36)  (0.71) 
Shocks (# times)  ‐0.40  ‐0.25  ‐0.01  ‐0.01 
  (0.54)  (0.70)  (0.99)  (1.00) 
Year fixed effect  Y  N  Y  N 
Village fixed effect  Y  N  Y  N 
Pseudo R‐square  0.157  0.077  0.379  0.245 
N  616  616  607  609 
 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: Resettlement subsidy targets dilapidated houses and habitats vulnerable to natural disaster. Land 
acquisitions subsidy targets households affected by public construction projects near the local county seat. 
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